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experts. Under Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1F, defense counsel has
no duty to surrender the defendant for a reciprocal examination by the
Commonwealth unless the defense decides to call the expert as a wit-
ness.33 Therefore, defense counsel may want to get informal assistance in
developing a theory of mitigation. Such informal assistance avoids the
need for a reciprocal examination, while still enabling the defense to build
its case.
34
II. Actual Innocence
35
On the issue of actual innocence, Spencer was alleging "innocence"
as an excuse for default. The Fourth Circuit held that the applicable test
was the "no reasonable juror" test of Sawyer v. Whitley,36 which requires
that but for the alleged error, no reasonable juror would have found the
defendant eligible for the death penalty. Although the Sawyer test is a
very stringent test, it is somewhat easier to meet than the Herrera "newly-
discovered evidence" test.
37
33 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(F) states, in relevant part:
If the attorney for the defendant gives notice pursuant to sub-
section E and the Commonwealth thereafter seeks an evalua-
tion concerning the existence or absence of mitigating cir-
cumstances relating to the defendant's mental condition at the
time of the offense, the court shall appoint one or more qual-
ified experts to perform such an evaluation.
(emphasis added)
34 See case summary of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.
Although the Fourth Circuit found Sawyer to be the "excuse for
default" standard, it found that the error complained of-the admission
of the expert evidence-was a state evidentiary law matter. If, however,
the issue defaulted was a clearly federal issue, the Sawyer test should
provide a way to save the defaulted claim for consideration in federal
court. An example of when the Sawyer "excuse for default" standard
would help the defendant is in a situation where the only aggravating fac-
tor supporting the death sentence was "vileness" and the jury was not
given any limiting construction of that term, and where the circum-
stances of the crime were arguably not vile within a constitutionally
acceptable definition of that term. In such a situation, defense counsel
could argue that no reasonable juror using a proper definition of the term
would have found vileness. In such a case the Sawyer test should permit
a defaulted challenge to the application of the vileness factor to be deter-
mined on its merits since the error complained of plainly implicates fed-
eral constitutional law.
Summary and analysis by:
Mar Karen Simmons
35 For more information about the actual innocence tests set forth in
Herrera v. Collins and Sawyer v. Whitley, see case summary of Spencer
I, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
36 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). See case summary of Sawyer, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 18 (1992). For an explanation of the "no
reasonable juror" requirement set forth in Sawyer, see also case summa-
ry of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
37 For an explanation of the "actual innocence" test set forth in
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), see case summary of Herrera,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 4 (1993). See also case summa-
ry of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
SWANN v. COMMONWEALTH
441 S.E. 2d 195 (Va. 1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On November 7, 1992, Calvin Swann, in need of money to buy
drugs, entered the Danville home of Conway Forrest Richter intending to
rob him. When Richter resisted, Swann shot him in the chest with a shot-
gun. Richter staggered to his front porch and collapsed. Swann then
removed Richter's wallet and fled with sixty dollars. After fleeing,
Swann disposed of most of his bloody clothing and sold his shotgun.
After an investigation, the police identified Swann, who was serving
time in the city jail on other charges, as a possible suspect. After securing
a Miranda waiver, the police interviewed Swann. After a number of
inconsistent statements by Swann and a series of suggestive representa-
tions and misrepresentations by the police, Swann confessed to the
killing, was tried, and convicted of capital murder.
At the penalty trial, defense counsel attempted to explain to the jury
1 Swann properly preserved a number of assignments of error which
the court reviewed in this case. They include: (1) failure to suppress
Swann's statements allegedly made involuntarily at the pretrial stage; (2)
failure to appoint an additional mental health expert to assist in evaluat-
ing Swann's reaction to anti-schizophrenic drugs, and to assist with the
case in mitigation; (3) the improper use of peremptory strikes to remove
that should Swann be sentenced to life in prison, it would be at least twen-
ty-one years before he could be released on parole. The Commonwealth
objected to counsel's attempt to inject information about parole law into
the proceeding. Foreclosed from discussing the reality of parole eligibil-
ity, defense counsel then attempted to assure the jury that sentencing
Swann to life in prison logically meant that he would remain in prison for
the rest of his life. The Commonwealth's attorney objected to this argu-
ment as well, and was permitted to deny before the jury that it correctly
characterized Swann's future after a life sentence. Relying on the statuto-
ry aggravating factor of "future dangerousness," the jury sentenced
Swann to death.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Swann made numer-
ous assignments of error concerning various aspects of the case.1 In addi-
two jurors from the panel on the basis of race; (4) the prejudicial admis-
sion of photographs and videotapes of the victim and the crime scene; (5)
the insufficiency of evidence of capital murder and robbery; (6) the
unconstitutionality of Virginia's capital statute and statutory verdict form.
The court rejected all of Swann's assertions, and the various arguments
will not be discussed in this summary.
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tion, the court reviewed Swann's death sentence to determine whether it
had been imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice, and
whether the punishment was disproportionate or excessive, as required
by statute.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected all of Swann's assignments
of error and affirmed the death sentence. 2 The court disposed of Swann's
claims in one of three ways: each issue was either (1) summarily dis-
missed as an "issue previously decided"; (2) rejected due to procedural
default; or (3) rejected on the merits.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
It is becoming more and more apparent to observers of Virginia
capital cases that the Supreme Court of Virginia is refusing to consider
viable claims of capital defendants, some involving the most fundamen-
tal of rights, based on little more than a respect for procedural orderli-
ness. The strict manner in which the court applies its default rules strikes
at the very heart of a reliable capital sentencing scheme. Unless capital
defense counsel begin to perform perfectly at the trial, properly preserv-
ing each and every error on the proper grounds, it is likely that capital
defendants will continue to be denied meaningful appellate review of
claims that their trials were infected with fundamental constitutional
error.
The capital trial of Calvin Swann illustrates many of the deficien-
cies in the application of Virginia's default rules. Rather than analyze the
specific holdings of the Swann decision, which is our practice, we will
use Swann as a framework for analysis of the systematic denial of mean-
ingful review of capital defendants' constitutional assignments of error.
2 Swann v. Commonwealth, 441 S.E. 2d 195 (Va. 1994).
3 See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(C).
4 See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-199.
5 See, e.g., King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 416 S.E.2d 669
(1992), and case summary of King, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No.
1, p. 37 (1992); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 385 S.E.2d 50
(1989), and case summary of Watkins, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2,
No. 1, p. 15 (1989). See also Straube, The Capital Defendant and Parole
Eligibility, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 45 (1992).
6 In 1988, the National Legal Research Group issued a report that
the typical jury-eligible citizen living in Prince Edward County, Virginia,
believed that a defendant sentenced to "life" in prison will serve only ten
years before being released. See Hood, The Meaning of Life for Virginia
Jurors and Its Effect in Capital Sentencing, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1624
(1989) (citing National Legal Research Group, Inc., Jury Research and
Trial Simulation Services, Report on Juror's Attitudes Concerning the
Death Penalty (Dec. 6, 1988)).
The importance of dispelling these misperceptions is especially sig-
nificant when one considers the data on attitudes towards the death penal-
ty when jurors are given definite alternatives. One study indicated that
more than two-thirds of those surveyed would be more likely to favor a
life sentence over the death penalty if they were assured that the defen-
dant would serve at least twenty-five ,ears of real prison time. See
Paduano & Smith, Deathly Errors: Misperceptions Concerning Parole in
the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 211,
223 (1987) (citing Codner, The Only Game in Town, 45 n. 114). A recent
report by the Death Penalty Information Center revealed that while sev-
I. Parole Eligibility
Before discussing the issues which Swann defaulted, it is important
to note that Swann did object to the court's refusal to allow the jury to
hear evidence during the penalty phase relating to parole eligibility.
Knowledge of this factor is essential to a proper understanding of the
import of sentence-related claims by Swann that the court later found to
have been defaulted. The evidence would have shown that if sentenced
to life in prison, the defendant would not be eligible for parole for twen-
ty-five years,3 and even if Swann was a model prisoner for the next
twenty years, he would only be eligible to earn five days of "good time"
per month against his sentence,4 and therefore his absolute minimum
time served would be twenty-one years. As has been its practice, the
Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the attempted proffer of parole eligi-
bility law.
5
By allowing the Commonwealth to block any attempts by defense
counsel to present accurate parole information to the jury, the Virginia
courts undermine the reliability of the capital trial. In many cases, parole
eligibility information might mean the difference between a life sentence
and the death penalty for many defendants, because of the misconcep-
tions the average juror carries with regard to what a life sentence means
in real prison time.6 The duty of the defense bar is to educate the public
at every opportunity outside of trial about the reality of Virginia's parole
laws mentioned above, until the time arrives when juries will be allowed
to be fully informed.7
H. The Mysterious Disappearance of Constitutional Claims
As was described above, once Swann had lost on the parole eligi-
bility issue, he attempted to tell the jury during his closing argument that
they could assume that a life sentence meant a prison term for life, and
enty-seven percent of those questioned expressed abstract support for the
death penalty, the percentage of those favoring the death penalty falls to
forty-four percent if the respondent was given the choice between death
or no parole for twenty-five years plus restitution. See Dieter, Sentencing
for Life: Americans Embrace Alternatives to the Death Penalty, A Report
by the Death Penalty Information Center, at 5 (April 1993).
7 It must be conceded, however, that if "truth in sentencing" became
permissible on motion by either party, each side in a capital case would
face an important tactical decision. Accurate parole information might
make a particular jury more likely to impose the death penalty. Despite
that possibility, given the statistics enumerated in the previous note,
defendants will normally be in a better position if their request for an
instruction on parole eligibility (or ineligibility) is granted. On the whole,
giving the jury all relevant information will be good for the system, and
will avoid the anguished reasoning a jury was forced to resort to in one
recent capital trial. The foreperson in that case remarked after the trial:
Unfortunately, due to our lack of knowledge and the fear that
if given a death sentence [the defendant] would win an
automatic new trial and be able to win freedom with anoth-
er jury, we decided, through discussion and creations of dif-
ferent scenarios, that the [life] sentence we gave ... would
incarcerate him for a longer time.
Letter to the Editor, Layne juryfound itself in a quandary, The Fincastle
Herald, Mar. 23, 1994, at 2A.
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the Commonwealth's attorney objected. Because defense counsel did not
object at this point, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that claims chal-
lenging the procedure to this point had been defaulted. Defense counsel
did object, however, when the Commonwealth's attorney was permitted
to rebut the "life means life" argument and told the jury: "The
Commonwealth denies the accuracy of [the life means life] statement."
The court admitted that defense counsel had properly objected at trial, but
rejected this argument without reviewing it because defense counsel
based his argument on this point before the Supreme Court of Virginia on
constitutional grounds, rather than on the grounds originally urged at
trial. 8 In addition, the court allowed a witness to state that Swann's earli-
er prior releases from prison were due to "mandatory release."
The ultimate result of the court's efforts was to deny Calvin Swann
the right to accurately inform the jury about what a life sentence actually
means. Moreover, it could be argued that the Commonwealth was
allowed to mislead the jury affirmatively. Nothing is more fundamental
to the constitutionality of a death penalty scheme than reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate sentence.9 Swann's case
demonstrates that in Virginia, even with that reliability at stake, failure to
object at the proper point or to base an appeal on the proper grounds, will
foreclose attempts to protect that right.
It is important to emphasize that the assignments of error which the
Supreme Court of Virginia routinely refuses to remedy are not minor,
rather they often concern the most basic constitutional rights. In addition
to the parole information issue discussed above, due to procedural default
the court refused to consider defendant's claim under Caldwell v.
Mississippi10 that the Commonwealth's attorney had made an improper
statement at voir dire when he said: "you wouldn't necessarily be taking
a life ... you'd just be making a decision .. about the evidence." The
court also invoked Rule 5:25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Virginia to hold defaulted Swann's claim that the Commonwealth violat-
ed Griffin v. California1 I when the Commonwealth's attorney mentioned
in his closing argument during the penalty phase that Swann had invoked
his right not to testify against himself at trial.
12
III. Conclusion
Calvin Swann's death sentence rested on a finding of future danger-
ousness by the jury. The jury that made that determination was not
allowed to consider that the defendant would not be eligible for parole for
twenty-five years. The jury was told that "life" does not mean life when
rendering a sentence. They were also introduced to the concept of manda-
tory parole. They listened to the Commonwealth's attorney suggest to
8 In its zeal to apply procedural bars, the court also failed to address
the merits of this claim on the grounds that were raised at trial, or even to
identify them. Swann, 441 S.E. 2d at 201. Perhaps this was because the
trial grounds were not brought forward on appeal, a point on which the
opinion is silent.
9 See note 13 infra and accompanying text.
10 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (holding that an argument which undermines
the jury's responsibility for rendering a death verdict is inconsistent with
the Eighth Amendment's need for heightened reliability in capital cases).
1 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that one should not draw inferences
them that the defendant was somehow at fault for invoking his constitu-
tional rights, and at least one panel at voir dire was told that this pro-
ceeding was just about judging evidence, rather than putting a man to
death.
All three of the constitutional claims sacrificed by the Swann court
to procedural orderliness bear on a factor that was found to be a prereq-
uisite to the granting of permission for states to employ the death penal-
ty:
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than
a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.
Because of that qualitative difference, there is a correspond-
ing difference in the need for reliability in the determination
that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
13
Procedural order is certainly a legitimate state interest. The force of
that interest pales, however, in comparison to the importance of reliabili-
ty in capital sentencing. Until the Supreme Court of Virginia acknowl-
edges this imbalance, however, only two basic approaches are available
to defense counsel.
One response is simply to refuse to be rushed at trial. Rarely will
defense counsel be able to try a capital case and properly preserve every
constitutional error under the strict standards of the Supreme Court of
Virginia. If the Supreme Court of Virginia is going to continue its hyper-
technicality, however, counsel can at least insist at trial on being afford-
ed the time and opportunity to make the record at every critical point and
on every available ground.
An additional option is to confront Virginia's imbalance in priorities
directly, by attacking Virginia's default scheme facially. Normally, fed-
eral courts will respect a state's default regime and will not hear argu-
ments procedurally defaulted under the state's rules. However, federal
courts may choose to disregard a state's default rules and will consider a
defendant's claim for the first time on federal habeas if the federal court
determines that the state procedural bars are unevenly and unjustly
applied. It has been argued that a Virginia litigant with a claim involving
his right to property may be faced with a less stringent application of the
default rules than a capital defendant, a manifest injustice. 14 If defense
counsel can convince the federal courts that Virginia's procedural default
scheme is applied unjustly, they will open a new avenue for meaningful
appellate review.
Summary and analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
from a defendant's silence because there are numerous reasons why an
innocent party might choose not to testify).
12 Swann, 441 S.E. 2d at 201 n.5.
13 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality
opinion).
14 For further analysis of this point and a general discussion on
attacking Virginia's procedural bars, see Groot, To Attain the Ends of
Justice: Confronting Virginia's Default Rules in Capital Cases, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
